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Abstract
The aim of our work is to measure the impact of social origins on the choice of the academic 
track in order to allow for consistent cross-country comparisons. We analyze Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, employing the data from PISA 2003. A substantive problem is 
that a good measure of  individual ability before tracking occurs is not available, thus ability 
cannot be adequately kept under control. A simple model for school choice is proposed, but 
the model is not identified with cross-section data. The consequences of unobserved ability 
are assessed; in the absence of a measure of ability at time the track, the logit regression 
coefficient of social background is an estimate of the total effect of social background, given 
by the sum of direct and indirect effects. This is a measure of substantive interest because it 
represents the total causal effect of social origins on school track. Yet, given that regression 
coefficients in logit models with independent unobserved heterogeneity are biased towards 
zero, comparison across countries are difficult; the average sample derivative of the response 
probability is employed, and it is shown to be a valid alternative measure of the effect of 
explanatory variables in this context. Our main substantive finding is that the total effect of 
social background on the choice of the academic track is weaker in the Netherlands and 
stronger in Germany, with Italy somewhere in between, although, as the German case reveals, 
when access is regulated by formal restrictions based on ability tests the role of parental 
background is significantly reduced. 
Keywords: equality of opportunity, intergenerational mobility, school systems, PISA, PIRLS
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1. Introduction
Equality of opportunities in education is a widespread goal. In spite of this, the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), carried out by OECD in order to 
evaluate how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the 
knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society (OECD, 2005)
1, 
highlights that in most countries performance is still greatly dependent on family background. 
Given that competencies also depend on the education programme and that preferences are 
related to social origin, understanding how school choices are undertaken is an important 
issue in the study of intergenerational mobility. The matter is particularly relevant in tracked 
school systems. “…Educational attainment is the major mediating factor in class mobility, 
* Paper prepared for the Workshop of the EDUC Research theme of EQUALSOC, Dijon 22-24/11/2007 
1 Every PISA survey tests reading, mathematical and scientific literacy in terms of general competencies, that 
is, how well students can apply the knowledge and skills they have learned at school to real-life challenges. 
PISA does not test how well a student has mastered a school’s specific curriculum.
1although this is more apparent when education is measured by highest level of qualification 
achieved  (academic  or  vocational) rather than  by  the number  of  years  of  education 
completed” Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002, pg. 37).
Tracks differ in the curriculum offered and in the average skills of the students. Choices 
are thus affected by individual ability and by family background. The aim of our work is to 
measure the impact of social origins on the choice of the track
2  in order to allow for 
consistent cross-country comparisons. We analyze Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany, 
employing data from PISA 2003
3. 
The age of tracking varies from 10 in Germany to 14 in Italy. Germany is an interesting 
reference point as its very early tracking system has been sharply criticized because it is 
believed to maximize the influence of parents’ social background on future educational 
attainment (Dustmann, 2001, Sinn, 2006). This argument is not supported by Checchi and 
Flabbi (2007), whose claiming is that the way students are sorted into tracks is less strongly 
related to parental background and more to individual ability in Germany compared to Italy
4.
There are few recent papers investigating the determinant of enrolment into the different 
tracks in Italy. Cappellari (2004) analyses the distinction between general and technical 
schools   together   with   the   public/private   dimension,   allowing   for   correlation   of   the 
unobservables in the two equations. Checchi and Flabbi (2007) study the determinants of the 
choice of different tracks with PISA, comparing Italy and Germany. Dustmann (2001) 
focuses on Germany. All the results indicate that social background still plays a substantial 
role in shaping educational decisions. There is also an ongoing project of the MPIB (Max-
Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin) aimed at investigating transition from primary 
to secondary school in Germany (MPIB, 2006), but the results are not yet available. 
The main problem we face with PISA  is that a good measure of the competencies acquired 
before tracking occurs is not available, thus we cannot adequately keep ability under control. 
A simple model for the process of  “ability building” is proposed (Fig. 1), but the model is not 
identified with cross-section data
5. In the absence of a measure of ability at time the track is 
chosen, under the assumption that initial ability is independent from individual and family 
characteristics, the regression coefficient of social background over school track is an 
estimate of the total effect of social background
6. Although we should seek to disentangle the 
direct and indirect effects, and thus identify primary and secondary effects (see Section 4), the 
estimated effect is still a measure of substantive interest because it represents the total causal 
effect of social background on school track. 
Checchi and Flabbi (2007), who also employ PISA data, adopt a different strategy: they 
include PISA performance scores to proxy ability. Our argument against this option is that 
2 Other features of secondary schools relevant also in comprehensive school systems are affected by social 
background. The most important is the choice between private and public schools. Contini, Scagni, Riehl 
(2007) attempt to evaluate for Italy whether decisions are related to the school social composition.
3 Clearly, the purpose of PISA is not the study of secondary school choices. Nevertheless, it is a good starting 
point for cross-country comparisons, because of common variable definitions and sampling scheme. This 
feature is particularly important for public policy evaluation, whenever the aim is to assess the impact of 
specific institutional features on educational outcomes.
4 As explained in the sequel, we will question this result. Although we do not specifically address the issue in 
this paper, we do find some evidence on this topic. A speculative interpretation of the statistical evidence is 
presented in the concluding section.  
5 Our model is coherent to the model underlying the counterfactual approach employed in a few recent 
contributions (see for example Erikson et al., 2005)  aiming at assessing the relative contribution of primary 
and secondary effects in educational attainment . However, lacking a clear measure of ability before tracking, 
this approach cannot be employed with PISA data.
6 Nurture and nature effects are indistinguishable if the independence assumption doesn’t hold.  
2these scores are endogenous, because they refer to a time well after that of school choice. 
Employing the PISA score can give rise to severe bias, as highlighted by the results of a set of 
simulations (see the Appendix).
Comparing the results across such a limited number of countries does not allow us to 
ascribe the differences to specific institutional features (Brunello and Checchi, 2007, for 
example, employ a much larger set of countries in order to evaluate the impact of school 
tracking on equality of opportunity). In spite of this, preliminary analyses on the effect of 
access restrictions to the higher level tracks can be carried out by exploiting the institutional 
differences across the German Länder (states). While in some states families are essentially 
free to choose the track, in other Länder decisions depend on a formal assessment testing the 
student’s ability. Assuming that restricted access is an exogenous policy, by comparing the 
social background effect in the states with formal restrictions with the states with no 
constraints, we can assess the impact of these rules on equality of opportunity in secondary 
school transitions. By enhancing sorting by ability, the social background effect should be 
weakened, as suggested by Checchi and Flabbi (2007). On the other hand, if primary effects 
are predominant (i.e. higher status children are on average more able that lower status 
students), access restrictions could in the end reinforce inequality of opportunity. The net 
effect of access restrictions on school track enrolment is thus theoretically undetermined. 
School designs of the countries under study differ in many other aspects. Given these 
institutional differences, it is difficult to find a comparable classification involving the 
distinction among academic, technical and vocational schools. Moreover in Germany the 
education system is Länder-based so that within the country students do not face the same set 
of available options (see Table 1). For this reason, we focus here on the more clear-cut 
distinction between the academic track (lyceum) and the other tracks. This option is  common 
in the literature (Erikson et al., 2005) and retains a close relation to the student's  decision on 
further (tertiary) education.
Our main finding is that the total effect of social background on the choice of the academic 
track is weaker in the Netherlands and stronger in Germany, with Italy somewhere in 
between. When access is regulated by formal restrictions based on ability tests the role of 
parental background is significantly reduced, as results from the estimation of the German 
model. In spite of this, the overall effect of social origin appears to be stronger in Germany 
than in Italy and the Netherlands even in the areas of the country where these rules apply, 
suggesting that these rules alone do not necessarily counterbalance the negative effects on 
equality of opportunity due to other features of the school design.         
In this paper we also address statistical issues. Logit models regression coefficients are 
estimable up to arbitrary identification restrictions on the error variance and with independent 
unobserved heterogeneity are biased towards zero (Cramer, 2005). Comparison across 
countries are difficult in this context. For this reason the average sample derivative of the 
response probability is sometimes employed as an alternative measure of the effect of 
explanatory variables. By extending the simulation study of Cramer using our model and 
calibrating the parameters on the relevant observed distributions, we verify that this 
alternative measure is not biased when ability is unobserved (see the Appendix). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the school systems of the 
countries under study. In Section 3 we present some descriptive evidence on selected 
outcomes of the decision process. Section 4 introduces the theoretical model and the 
estimable model when ability is not observed. In Section 5 we discuss the statistical problems 
arising when the effects of explanatory variables are compared across samples. Section 6 is 
devoted to the empirical analysis and the data. The simulation study is described in the 
Appendix.
32. Educational Systems
In this paper we compare three countries with a tracked school system: Italy, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Tracking generally occurs at 10 years old in Germany
7, at 12 in 
the Netherlands, at 14 in Italy. In this section we briefly review the main features of the 
education systems in each of these countries.  
2.1 Italy
Compulsory education starts at the age of six, with the five year cycle of primary school, 
continues with three years of lower secondary education (scuola secondaria di primo grado), 
still comprehensive, and, ending at the age of fifteen
8, usually lasts until the first year of 
upper secondary school (scuola secondaria di secondo grado). At age 14 students choose 
their upper secondary school between a variety of different programmes. 
The academic track lasts five years and contains different types of lyceum (liceo), 
classical, scientific, linguistic or artistic. The  socio-pedagogic lyceum, the former istituto 
magistrale, prepares students for the profession of primary teacher, for which only recently a 
further course at university has become necessary. Furthermore there are technical (istituti 
tecnici) and vocational (istituti professionali) upper secondary schools, the first lasting five 
and the second three years. These two lead directly to a professional qualification. 
There are no special admission requirements, such as ability tests or marks, for access to 
the different upper secondary school types. All tracks permit access to university, provided 
that the final certificate is obtained after five years of schooling, with two integrative years 
for the istituti professionali. (Eurydice, 2006b).
2.2 Netherlands
Primary education takes place in an 8 year cycle from the age of four (facultative) or five 
(compulsive) until about 12 (in fact most children start school at the age of four). Compulsory 
education lasts 12 years full time, at least until age 16, followed by another year of at least 
part-time schooling (Eurydice, 2006c). At twelve, pupils are divided into three main tracks. 
The academic VWO prepares students for university in six years, the HAVO provides 
higher general education for five years after which students can access higher professional 
education and the VMBO is a school of vocational education, divided into different sectors 
and pathways, lasting four years and giving access to apprenticeship. 
For admission to the different tracks, student's suitability is assessed by a primary school 
leavers attainment test; parents may express a preference, but the final decision is taken by 
the secondary school board.
There is a maximum time of five years (extended to six in special cases) to complete the 
lower secondary level, which are the first three years of VWO and HAVO and whole four year 
VMBO course. If a student fails twice in the same grade he must change to another type of 
school. The leaving certificates of one school (VMBO or HAVO) give access to a higher level 
school (HAVO or VWO) only if the curriculum meets certain requirements. 
Most schools are combined schools offering more than one track. A feature of the Dutch 
education policy is the freedom to set up private schools, which are publicly financed and 
attended by over 70% of all students (Eurydice, 2003).
7  In two German states, Berlin and Brandenburg, tracking takes place after 6 years of primary school at the 
age of twelve (Woessmann 2007). 
8  With effect from school year 2009/2010, the end of compulsory education shall be raised to the age of 16 
(Andrews, Brown, Sargent 2007), so that it will last ten instead of nine years.
42.3 Germany
In Germany the Länder (states) have the responsibility over educational issues, making the 
German school system rather heterogeneous. Institutional differences regard the type of 
schools students are tracked into, and the admission requirements to the different tracks. 
Primary school lasts four years (from age 6 to 10). Pupils are subject to compulsory 
education from 6 to 18, with at least 9 years of full-time schooling. Primary school are 
generally requested to give a recommendation for the transition to secondary school, but 
while in some Länder families are anyhow free to choose
9, in others this choice is conditional 
on a formal assessment testing the student’s suitability for the selected track. In any case, 
once the student has begun secondary school, each grade can be repeated only once and the 
new failure in the same or the following grade leads to a change of school to a lower level.
In the most common system there are three distinct tracks, on different ability levels: 
Gymnasium (academic), which lasts nine years now being reduced to eight for a total 12 years 
of schooling, Realschule (professional), with six grades, and Hauptschule (vocational), with 
five or six years of schooling. The first gives access to university, the other two to different 
professional or vocational education and apprenticeship, usually organised in the so-called 
dual-system, i.e. a combination of job training and school lessons. After the Hauptschule, the 
Realschule leaving certificate can be obtained at the vocational school as well, if the student 
reaches a certain performance level. Similarly, the transition from Realschule to Gymnasium 
is in principle allowed, but is conditional on achievement level. 
In some of the Länder there are only two distinct tracks, because  Realschule  and 
Hauptschule  are combined in only one school
10  but the school leaving certificates are 
equivalent to those in the three-track-system (Eurydice, 2006a). In most states there is also 
the   alternative   of   a   comprehensive   school   (Integrierte   Gesamtschule  or  Kooperative 
Gesamtschule) combining all three schools. In some of the Länder more students are enrolled 
to this kind of institution than to the more traditional school types. So every Land has its very 
own combination of school types and its own rules for admission.
Table 1 illustrates the main secondary school options in the 16 states. The numbers refer to 
the percentage of students reported in the German “PISA 2003 extension study” (Prenzel et 
al., 2005). The last column indicates the Länder with most restricting rules for admission to 
Realschule or Gymnasium at that time (KMK, 2006). 
9 Or, in some cases, a first period at the new school is considered as a trial period. About one third of German 
students attend school systems that involve significant restrictions on track choice.
10 Different names are given to these schools:  Oberschulen, Sekundarschulen, Erweiterte Realschulen, 
Mittelschulen, Regelschulen.
5Table 1. Frequencies of 15 years-old students in main school types by Länder in Germany 








Baden-Württemberg  27.8% 30.3% 27.9% restricted
Bayern 26.3% 27.2% 32.2% restricted
Berlin 34.5% 21.6% 11.2% 27.3% free
Brandenburg 30.8% 15.7% 50.1% free
Bremen 30.6% 26.7% 21.7% 15.5% free
Hamburg 33.4% 14.9% 10.6% 25.4% 5.1% free
Hessen 31.7% 27.0% 15.6% 16.6% free
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 25.8% 9.6% 53.2% free
Niedersachsen 26.6% 33.5% 28.3% free
Nordrhein-Westfalen 28.8% 24.7% 26.6% 16.2% free
Rheinland-Pfalz 25.8% 22.2% 22.9% 12.8% free
Saarland 25.7% 13.5% 45.7% restricted
Sachsen 32.0% 61.8% restricted
Sachsen-Anhalt 30.6% 60.9% free
Schleswig-Holstein 25.2% 31.4% 29.3% 6.5% free
Thüringen 30.5% 57.6% restricted
3. Some outcomes of the selection process. Descriptive evidence
Measuring how strongly social origins influence the secondary school decision process is 
the issue tackled in present work. In this section we examine some descriptive evidence on 
potential outcomes of this process: social stratification in secondary schools and the extent to 
which  PISA scores vary across schools and school tracks. 
A few words on the  Programme for International Student Assessment. PISA is an 
international survey of the knowledge and skills of 15 year olds promoted every three years 
by OECD (first survey in year 2000). Each survey covers different skills: mathematics, 
reading comprehension, science and problem solving. The main assessment for PISA 2003 is 
on mathematics: tests evaluate how well students can recognize, formulate and tackle 
mathematical problems in real life contexts. The questionnaire contains detailed information 
on the family background of students. A specific index is provided, the so-called ESCS (Index 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Status, see section 6.1).
PISA reports reveal wide differences in countries’ skill profiles. Average scores in the math 
test are reported in Table 3, column (4): Italy is placed at the very lowest ranks in the OECD 
list
11, Germany is around the average, while the Netherlands is considered a well performing 
country  (OECD, 2004). 
A simple measure of social stratification in schools is given by the ratio of the variance 
between schools and the total variance of the ESCS. This analysis can be carried out with 
PISA data because around 30 students are randomly chosen within each selected school. The 
measure is reported in Table 2 column (1) for selected countries. Generally speaking, tracked 
systems rank in the top half of the list (for example Hungary, Austria, Italy, Germany, 
France), the only exception being the Netherlands, where the variance ratio is much smaller, 
11 Regional differences in Italy are very marked: average scores of students from the Northern part of the 
country are much higher than those from the South, the former being at the level of Denmark (higher that 
OECD's average), the latter being at the level of Turkey, the worse performing country of the area.
6close to that encountered in comprehensive school systems. The percentage of variance 
between tracks (as opposed to single schools) is reported in column (2). Similar results are 
described in Jenkins et al. (2006).
When turning to the analysis of math PISA scores (Table 3), we find the Netherlands at the 
first place in the OECD area, followed by Germany. In both countries the score variance 
between single schools is more than 60% of the total variance and the one between school 
tracks is over 50%. In Italy the value is smaller but still rather high if we look at the single 
school level, but when we consider tracks it drops to less than 25%. 
The differences encountered across schools and school types are to be interpreted with 
caution, because PISA scores represent ability at the time of the survey, not before school 
choice is undertaken. Thus, the data does not tell us how well the education systems divide 
students according to their ability, because skills keep on developing during secondary 
school, and the “rate of growth” may be different across individuals and tracks. Cross-country 
comparisons are difficult also because tracking does not occur everywhere at the same age, as 
described in section 6.
Nevertheless, these numbers do suggest that:
• in the Netherlands students are well divided by ability into tracks and these differences 
only to a small extent reflect social differences;
• in Germany school sorting also seems to be highly related to ability (although tracking 
here occurs earlier than elsewhere, so the issue of endogeneity is more severe), however 
social stratification is much stronger than in the Netherlands;
• in Italy there are also deep social differences among schools, while performance variability 
is large across schools but much less across tracks, implying that a large fraction of the 
differences among students of different schools are not related to the differences in the 
curricula.
Table 2. Social stratification in schools. Analysis of variance between schools and between school 
















Hungary 0,449 0,784 -0,068 0,885
Mexico 0,443 1,451 -1,129 1,205
Turkey 0,403 1,203 -0,980 1,097
Austria 0,343 0,723 0,061 0,851
Italy 0,343 0,216 1,048 -0,111 1,024
Germany 0,332 0,232 0,978 0,160 0,989
Belgium 0,331 0,888 0,152 0,942
France 0,315 0,870 -0,078 0,933
Spain 0,305 1,011 -0,297 1,005
United States 0,272 0,835 0,296 0,914
Netherlands 0,257 0,159 0,733 0,098 0,856
Poland 0,253 0,675 -0,201 0,822
Finland 0,141 0,688 0,247 0,830
h
2 is the ratio of the variance between schools or school-types over the total variance of  ESCS

















Netherlands 0,659 0,556 8082 538 89,9
Germany 0,629 0,511 9911 503 99,6
Turkey 0,614 10161 423 100,8
Hungary 0,602 8050 490 89,7
Belgium 0,575 11375 529 106,7
Italy 0,569 0,246 8465 466 92,0
Austria 0,563 8085 506 89,9
Mexico 0,542 6484 385 80,5
France 0,520 7758 511 88,1
United States 0,310 8487 483 92,1
Spain 0,272 7145 485 84,5
Poland 0,168 7482 490 86,5
Finland 0,083 6365 544 79,8
h
2 is the ratio of the variance between schools or school-types over the total variance of  the math PISA scores
  
4. The model 
“Human capital accumulation is a dynamic process. The skills acquired in one stage of the 
life cycle affect both the initial conditions and the technology of learning at the next stage. …
A major determinant of successful school is successful families. School operate more 
efficiently if parents reinforce them by supporting and encouraging children.” (Carneiro and 
Heckman, 2003, pg. 6). 
We analyze how social background affects secondary school choice  (see Figure 1), 
assuming that:
i) there is a latent unobservable individual “initial ability” not correlated with individ-
ual’s social background SB
12;
ii) the individual ability before school choice is undertaken (we will call it “previous 
ability”) depends on initial ability and SB;
iii) the choice of secondary school ST depends on previous ability and SB.
The effect of social background on school-choice is twofold.
• Direct effect: given the level of ability, individuals from higher social background are more 
likely to enrol in the academic track (as they generally have higher aspirations, lower 
opportunity costs…);    
• Indirect effect: higher status children reach on average higher levels of ability at the end of 
primary or lower secondary school (they may be exposed to more intellectual stimulation, 
receive more parental motivation and support for schoolwork… the so-called nurture 
effects). Being more skilled, they are more motivated to choose the academic track. 
12 Assumption i) is rather strong: if intelligence was at least partially inherited, an intergenerational mechanism 
of social selection could be at work, giving rise to a correlation between “initial ability” and social status 
(Woessmann, 2004). In this case it would not be possible to separate nurture effects from nature effects.
8The intensity of the indirect effect depends on how strongly decisions are affected by 
ability, but also on the way ability is influenced by social background. Direct and indirect 
effects can be related to the conceptual distinction between primary and secondary effects. 
Primary effects, “those … that create class differentials in demonstrated ability early in 
children’s educational careers…” (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002, pg. 41), are represented by 
the association between social origins and ability, the first arrow of the indirect effect. 
Secondary effects, “those that later operate through the choices that children make among the 
options they have available”, correspond to the direct effect.
Policy implications of a high primary effect   vs. a high secondary effect are rather 
different. In the latter   case interventions should be directed towards enhancing the 
performance of low status children at primary school level, in order to reduce the ability gap. 
In the latter case the focus should be on endorsing the enrolment of lower status children into 
the academic track.    
In order to assess direct and indirect effects, data on student's ability before secondary 
school choice is needed. As Breen et al. (2005) point out, the different effects of social origin 
on educational attainment are impossible to disentangle without adequate longitudinal data. 
Under the assumptions made above, when we model school choice without controlling for 
ability the regression coefficient of SB will represent the total effect of social origins on 
school track, given by the sum of the direct and the indirect effect. This is however a quantity 
of substantive interest because it is altogether a causal effect.
Figure 1. Modeling secondary school choice and PISA scores
Let   t y   represent ability at time  t. Consider the time of birth  t=0, a time  t=1 before 
secondary school choice and the time of the PISA survey t=2. Thus: 
-  0 y  is the unobservable initial ability; 
-  1 y  is the so-called “previous ability” (potentially observable, but here unobserved); 
-  2 y  is ability at t=2, measured by the PISA score. 
Let SB be a continuous measure of social background, while ST is a binary variable taking 
the value 1 if the academic track is chosen and 0 otherwise. Translating into formal terms the 




































y2i='' y1i' SBi' ST iυi (3)
Notice that all the regression coefficients in the model are likely to be positive. 
Following the usual notation for binary choice models, ST* is a latent variable related to 
the utility of enrolling in the academic track, and ST is its observed counterpart. The errors for 
each equation are mutually independent and independent from the explanatory variables 
included in their own equation. Initial ability is regarded as a random variable independent 
from all observed and unobserved individual characteristics:  y0 ,SB=0  and  y0,u=0 . 
If the error ei has a standard logistic distribution, equations (2a)–(2b) give rise to the well 












represents the relative change in the odds of enrolling in the academic track following to a 
one unit rise of SB.
Equation (3), the model for the PISA score, is based on the assumption that scores are 
directly affected by previous ability, school-type and social background. This equation will be 
employed in the appendix with the purpose of evaluating the strategy of  using the PISA score 
as a proxy for previous ability. 
Given that  1 y  is not observed, when ignoring ability the equation for latent ST* becomes: 
ST*i = y0iSBiuiSBiεi  
           =SBi y0iuiεi (4)
With respect to the effect of SB on school choice, we observe that:
• the coefficient of  SB  is given by  λγξ  ; it represents the total effect of social 
background on the probability to enrol in higher track schools
13 and is given by sum of 
the direct effect x and the indirect effect lg; 
13 If the assumption of independence between social background and “initial ability” did not hold, a third 
component would enter the estimated total effect, representing the so-called nature effects.
10• the direct effects of ability and social background  l  and  x are not identified.  x 
represents the net effect of social background given ability and l is the net effect of 
ability given social background;
• x also represents secondary effects of social origin on secondary school choices; is not 
an exhaustive measure of the influence of SB on school choice, because indirect 
effects are potentially relevant too; 
• g, a component of the indirect effect, represents the primary effect of SB.  
Note that g cannot be estimated within the PISA database, although, as we will see, it is 
possible to approximately evaluate it by employing the data of the comparative education 
survey PIRLS
14, submitted to fourth grade students.
The error term in equation (4)  λβ y0iuii  is larger than the original error ei, and is 
still independent  from explanatory variable  SB. Moreover, its distribution is generally no 
longer a logistic. 





Consequences of the omission of ability on the estimate of the total effect are discussed in 
the following section.
5. Comparing the effect of social background across countries 
Assessing the effect of explanatory variables on the response variable is more complicated 
in binary response models than in linear models, in particular with neglected heterogeneity. 
This circumstance is relevant in our context because previous ability is omitted. 
5.1 General discussion
First, logit (and probit) models are non-linear: the effect on the probability Pr(Y=1|x) 
varies with the value of  the independent variables: where the probability curve is almost flat 
the response probability varies little; where the curve is steep the response probability 
exhibits a much larger change. When we describe the effect of the variable by means of the 
regression coefficient  b  we miss this point. Notice that for given  x, the slope of the 
probability curve varies also with the value of the constant and of the other explanatory 
variables (see Figure 2). 
For this reason, alternative measures of the impact of the regressors on the response 
variable have been proposed in the econometric literature (see for example Long, 1997; 
Wooldridge, 2002) and are now widely employed. These measures are based on the slope of 
the probability curve, i.e., the partial derivative of Pr(Y=1|x) with respect to each explanatory 
variable xk. 
In particular, let y be a binary response variable, x a vector of explanatory variables and b 
the vector of associated coefficients: 
14 PIRLS is an international survey aimed at evaluating reading comprehension of fourth grade students across 
a number of countries. For further details see section 6.4.
11ASE=sample mean





n ∂  Pr y=1∣x
∂ xk
is the average slope over all the sample units; following Cramer (2005) we call this measure 
ASE (average sample effect). Note that for a given b its value changes according to the actual 
location of the explanatory variables in the sample. Suppose we wish to compare the effect of 
xk across countries. Consider countries A and B, with the same value of bk; if explanatory 
variables in country A are positioned where the curve is almost flat while in country B they 
are in the steep part of the curve then, when xk changes, the response probability changes 
more in B than in A. Coherently,  B A ASE ASE < .
Another measure is given by the slope of the response probability at the average value of 
the explanatory variables   x , which can be thought as a “representative” individual. We call 
it the effect at the sample average (ESA):
ESA =
∂  Pry=1∣ x
∂ xk




 Pr y=1∣x1−  Pr y=1∣x  k
ESA=  Pr y=1∣ x1−  Pr y=1∣ x  k
Figure 2. Slope of the logistic function at different values of explanatory variables
The interpretation problems of b become more severe with neglected heterogeneity. The 
omission of an orthogonal regressor (i.e., uncorrelated with the included explanatory 
variables) does not affect b OLS estimates in linear models. On the other hand, standard 
methods’ estimates for binary choice models are not unbiased: the omission of an orthogonal 
regressor will  bias coefficients towards zero  (Cramer, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). This 
behaviour is related to the fact that arbitrary assumptions on the error variance are necessary 
to identify regression coefficients. When an orthogonal explanatory variable w is omitted the 
parameter being estimated is no longer the original bk, but a smaller value, given by:
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If the variance or the coefficient of the omitted variable change greatly across countries, 
the amount of the bias would be substantially different, thus comparing the estimated b could 
be meaningless. Suppose you find   βkA βkB . Does this relation hold because the effect of the 
independent variable is stronger in country B, or is it because the coefficient is more heavily 
underestimated in country A? 
Luckily, ASE is not affected by independent neglected heterogeneity. Wooldridge (2002, 
pg. 471) proves the result for the probit model, in the case where the omitted variable has a 
normal distribution. The behaviour of ASE is more difficult to derive analytically for the logit 
model. Cramer (2005) develops a simple simulation study, and finds that  ASE  is hardly 
affected also in logit models. No such results are available for ESA.
A first intuition behind this result is that, although the estimate of  b  declines with 
uncorrelated   unobserved   heterogeneity,   this   neglected   source   of   variation   –   by 
underestimating the variability among the Pr(Y=1|x) – pushes them closer to the average 
value. Since Pr(Y=1|x)[1- Pr(Y=1|x)] reaches its minimum value when Pr(Y=1|x)=0.5, the 
consequence  is   that  with  unobserved   heterogeneity    Pr(Y=1|x)[1-   Pr(Y=1|x)]   is   over-
estimated. The two effects compensate each other.
The intuitive explanation provided by Wooldridge (2002) is also insightful. If x is the 
observed vector and w is the omitted variable, partial effects of  Pr(Y=1|x) can be employed 
because they are always the average of the partial effects of the Pr(Y=1|x,w) over the 
distribution of w.
5.2 Back to the specific model
We will now turn to how these general issues apply to the specific model represented by 
equations (1)-(4). First notice that omitted previous ability  1 y  is not uncorrelated with social 
background SB. Nevertheless, because of the particular structure imposed by equation (1), we 
can still refer to the framework described above. The relevant assumption is here given by the 
independence of initial ability  0 y  and social background  SB.
The omission of previous ability  1 y  implies that, instead of dealing with the original full 
equation (2c), we estimate the reduced equation (5). Thus, the coefficient of SB turns into 
 , the total effect of SB on school choice, and the error term (see equation 4) is given 
by  y0iuii , it is therefore larger than the original error and still independent from 
SB. 
With a linear model the omission of  1 y  does not affect the estimate of   . On the 
other hand, the  estimates for binary choice models are no longer unbiased: neglected 
heterogeneity will bias coefficients towards zero. The total effect of SB on school choices is 
therefore underestimated. Moreover, since the error term in equation (4) depends on l, i.e. on 
the way previous ability affects school choices, if in some countries individual ability plays a 
greater role in shaping school choices than in others, these countries will suffer from a larger 
relative bias. In this light, the direct comparison of     across countries could lead to 
ambiguous results.
Since the simulation exercise developed by Cramer (2005) is based on a very simple 
model, we have carried out an extensive simulation study based on model (1)-(4), in order to 
test the behaviour of ASE and provide a guidance for the magnitude of the bias of regression 
13coefficients in the specific context under study. The results, largely confirming that  ASE 
adequately captures the total effect of SB on school choices, are reported in the Appendix. 
The same simulations were also carried out for ESA, which instead appears to be sensitive to 
neglected heterogeneity. Thus, ASE only will be shown in the empirical results.
The simulations also have the purpose of showing that employing the PISA scores as a 
proxy for ability at the time of the choice is not a sound strategy. Referring to a time well 
after that of school choice (one year later for Italy, 5 years later for Germany), the score is 
endogenous. With this strategy both the direct effect of social background on school track x 
and the ability coefficient can be severely biased.
6. The empirical analysis
The reduced model for school track choice ST basically defined in (5) was estimated for 
the three countries examined. 
6.1 Description of the variables 
The dependent variable ST is dichotomous and distinguishes Liceo for Italy
15, Gymnasium 
for Germany and VWO for the Netherlands from all other school types.
The social background SB is here represented by the ESCS Index of economic, social and 
cultural status as defined by PISA analysts. ESCS is a second level index provided by PISA 
based on three first level indexes, regarding parent's professional status, their educational 
background and household possessions related to culture (e.g. books) and technology (e.g. 
PCs). The score is given by the first principal component obtained by the analysis of the three 
lower level indexes and standardized with respect to OECD average.
Although the main interest lies in studying the SB total effect on track choice, a set of 
control dummy variables was added, with some country-specific items for Germany and 
Italy:
FEMALE female
FOREIGN non-native or first-generation students
FAMDUM standard family: father and mother living together with student
AREA (Italy only): geographical area (North West, North East, Center, South and 
Isles)
EAST (Germany only): former Eastern German Democratic Republic state
16
RIGID (Germany only): states with specific rules for transition from primary to 
secondary school restricting access to Gymnasium and Realschule
17
15 In the PISA dataset for Italy licei are not distinguished from istituti magistrali, now called socio-pedagogic 
lyceum. Because of the specific features of this school type, they have been separated by identifying as 
socio-pedagogic-lyceums schools with over 80% female students (this is the value for which the survey share 
of students in each type of school is closest to the proportion reported by the official statistics at a national 
level). Istituti magistrali are not considered lyceums in the analysis.
16 Following Woessmann (2007) the state of Berlin has been classified as an Eastern German Länder.
17 In the PISA 2003 dataset the German Länder are not explicitly identified. We have sent a request for this 
information to the IQB (Institute for Educational Progress, Berlin). In the meantime, a first identification is 
possible because the states have been used as a stratification variable (OECD 2005), with 18 strata included 
in the data file (variable STRATUM). Excluding the two of them which refer to special education and 
vocational education, the remaining 16 strata have been attributed to the 16 German states as follows. The 
German states have been ordered by the number of students as reported in official statistics, and then 
compared to strata size. A cross tabulation of the original variables STRATUM and PROGN has been 
analysed in order to see the combination of different school types existing in each stratum and the percentage 
14Two additional control variables, defined for Germany only and capturing part of the 
complexity of the schooling system in that country, were tested, but their effect was not 
significant:
• the indicator of states with only two main tracks (not counting comprehensive school), 
combining Hauptschule and Realschule together;
• the indicator of states with comprehensive schools available for students.
While of course these institutional characteristics do influence track choices by modifying 
the choice set itself, when tracking is studied with respect to the simple alternative between 
lyceums-type school and all others, these differences are no longer relevant.
The other area where availability of further data would be obviously useful is that of 
student's ability assessment. Two items recorded by PISA 2003 have some relevance here, but 
for some reasons were not included in the model: 
• A rough proxy of pre-track ability is provided by grade repetitions. As a rule, we should 
also expect SB to be negatively correlated with it, causing its coefficient to decrease when 
this variable is included. However, in Italy grade repetitions up to lower secondary school 
are quite uncommon (around 1,7% in the sample): the variable indicates the presence of 
extreme situations, and thus does not capture a consistent amount of variation in previous 
scores. So, the coefficient of SB will change only slightly when this variable is introduced. 
Even if in Germany and the Netherlands grade repetitions are less rare, the variable is 
clearly an unsuitable measure of ability, as it has no sensibility at all for all situations 
except the really critical cases.
• The math mark in the last school report is also requested in the student's questionnaire. 
However this information, besides being measured on a scale that can differ even between 
single schools, is not really pre-track, especially for countries with early age tracking. 
Therefore it is generally only slightly less endogenous than PISA score.
6.2 Sampling scheme and estimation methods
As common in educational surveys, PISA uses a two stage sampling procedure, where 
schools are the primary sampling units, chosen with probability proportional to their size (in 
students). Within each selected school, 35 fifteen years old students are randomly chosen. 
Appropriately weighting the students selected from each school, each student would have the 
same   selection   probability.   However,   weights   still   need   to   be   adjusted   due   to   the 
oversampling of some population strata, school and student non-response and inaccuracies in 
the school size records.
The Italian sample covers 11.639 students, including oversampling in some regions
18 
following specific requests of local educational authorities. The available German sample is 
smaller (at 4.660 students) when compared with population size, since all units belonging to 
local oversampling schemes were not included in it. Finally, Dutch schools are represented by 
3.992 units.
The two-stage sampling procedure affects the distribution of sampling estimates. Standard 
inference - ignoring the correlation among observations - underestimates standard errors, 
causing significance tests to reject the null hypothesis of single coefficients being equal to 0 
much too often. Standard errors can be consistently estimated with resampling methods: PISA 
of students enrolled to them. Combining this information with the figures of the PISA-E 2003 report (Prenzel 
et al. 2005), strata and states can be reasonably put together. The relatively small sample size (4660 students 
in Germany) does not allow comparisons between single states. But a division in two groups, for example by 
the binary variables EAST or RIGID, is possible.
18 Among them Piedmont, Tuscany, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige.
15analysts   suggest   using   the   modified   Balanced   Repeated   Replication   (BRR)   approach 
proposed by Fay. BRR is derived from the well-known Jackknife method but uses a more 
complex scheme of sample unit removing and re-weighting; further stability to the procedure 
is added by Fay modification, that avoids the complete removal of any sample unit and builds 
each replication only using weights.
In the present work estimation is also based on Fay's method; to achieve optimal 
performance and extend the approach to additional statistical techniques, however, relevant 
SPSS code made available by PISA was updated and further developed.
6.3 Results from PISA
Parameter estimates for the  ST  model on each country are given in Table 4, 5 and 6 
respectively for Italy, Germany and the Netherlands, together with ASEESCS values and Wald 
tests for the hypothesis of global model significance.
The models for Italy and Germany also contain an interaction term. In the German model 
the negative  interaction  between ESCS and  RIGID  suggests that the influence of social 
origins on school choice is weaker in the states where restrictions to track choice are at work. 
In this case the ASEESCS is actually replaced by two values: ASEESCS, estimated on data for 
“nonrigid” states only, and  ASEESCS+ESCS*RIGID, estimated on data for “rigid” states.
While parameter estimates can be severely biased as a consequence of the omission of y1 
on the right-hand side of the model, (as confirmed by the simulation studies performed for 
this study, see Appendix), ASE values are not. It is then convenient to better evaluate the 
distribution of these statistics, based on the Fay-BRR replication method.
Table 4. Estimation results. Modelling ST for Italy with and without ESCS-FEMALE interaction
b (sb) e
b P-value
19 b (sb) e
b P-value
Constant -1,531
(0,151) 0,216 0,000 -1,47
(0,145) 0,230 0,000
ESCS 1,304
(0,078) 3,685 0,000 1,118
(0,075) 3,058 0,000
FEMALE 0,551







(0,324) 0,506 0,035 -0,691
(0,324) 0,501 0,033
FAMDUM 0,219
(0,101) 1,245 0,029 0,224
(0,101) 1,252 0,026
NorthEast -0,42
(0,211) 0,657 0,047 -0,423
(0,218) 0,655 0,052
Center 0,328













Wald test (complete model) 
= 389,1
19 Based on the hypothesis of approximated normality of parameter estimates.
16Table 5. Estimation results. Modelling ST for Germany with and without FOREIGN dummy
b (sb) e
b P-value b (sb) e
b P-value
Constant -1.756
(0.167) 0.1727 0.0000 -1.794
(0.167) 0.1663 0.0000
ESCS 1.413





(0.133) 0.8247 0.1481 -0.249
(0.13) 0.7793 0.0557
FEMALE 0.477





(0.11) 1.1854 0.1220 0.188
(0.109) 1.2074 0.0843
EASTDUM 0.351
(0.246) 1.4202 0.1541 0.369
(0.246) 1.4468 0.1325
RIGID 0.104


























Wald test (complete 
model)=223.00
Figure   3   illustrates   the   approximate   sampling   distribution   of  ASEESCS  (and 
ASEESCS+ESCS*RIGID) for each country
20. These distributions display a very limited amount of 
overlapping, suggesting that differences are significant; the least total SB  effect is in the 
Netherlands, followed by Italy and then Germany (with the “rigid” states first). 
Access restrictions seem to weaken inequality of opportunity in track enrolment. Two 
considerations are to be made. First, this result does not arise from a well defined impact 
evaluation design, thus it should be validated with further studies
21. Second, the result applies 
for Germany, and should not be generalised to other countries, as it is likely that this policy 
20 Since only 80 replicated observations are available for each density estimation, the histogram shows very 
rough B-spline smoothing approximations.
21 The study of the effect of specific institutional features on performance scores carried out by Woessman 
(2007) – based on a regression model where the slope of the socio-economic gradient of each state is related 
to the features of the educational system – does not include access restrictions among the characteristics 
under investigation.
17will interact with other features of the educational system, potentially giving rise to different 
effects in different contexts.
Note that the associated parameter estimates shown in Tables 4-6 display an ordering 
which is inconsistent with that of ASE: by comparing Italy and the Netherlands, the ASE  is 
larger for Italy, whereas the ESCS coefficient is larger for the Netherlands. As pointed out in 
section 5.1, logit regression parameters may have an ambiguous meaning with unobserved 
heterogeneity.
Figure 3. SB total effect ASE - estimated distribution (via Fay-BRR) in each country
6.4 Results from PIRLS
PIRLS stands for  Progress in International reading literacy study, an assessment of 
students' reading achievement at fourth grade conducted every five years by IEA - the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
22. 2001 PIRLS data 
are analyzed here.
While PIRLS survey data are not the main focus of interest here, they can help to assess 
y1, since PIRLS performance scores
23 are pre-track for all countries, while being reasonably 
closer to the tracking time than to pupils' time of entry into the schooling system.
It is thus possible to obtain a rough estimate of g by modeling PIRLS test scores on some 
item pertaining to the family socio-economic background recorded in the same survey. 
Since information in this area is more limited in PIRLS than in PISA, defining a composite 
SB index similar to ESCS proves difficult here. The variable of choice was then the highest 
educational level attained by parents, measured with 2 dummies for secondary and tertiary as 
opposed to primary educational level
24. 
The PIRLS survey has sampling features  analogous  to the PISA context, and model 
estimation on it was performed using a similar replication-based approach.
Evidenced offered by Table 7 suggests a stronger SB effect on y1 in Germany, even when 
22 PIRLS 2001 International Report: IEA's Study of reading literacy achievement in primary schools, Mullis et 
al., 2003, Boston College
23 Taken here as a mean of the results obtained on a set of different reading and comprehension test items.
24 The choice is motivated by the closeness with ESCS the latter shows on PISA data. If the highest parental 
educational status is measured, somewhat improperly, on a simple integer scale (1 primary, 2 secondary, 3 
tertiary), correlation is high (r > 0,8), and a linear regression of ESCS on this item gives a coefficient which 
is very close to 1.
18

















ASEtaking into account the presence of non natives (and  offspring  of non native parents). 
Coefficients for Italy and the Netherlands are instead lower and quite close, with a slight 
prevalence for Italy when higher education is involved.










































































F test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All the coefficients are highly statistically significant.
a. Geographical area (North West, North East, Centre, South and Isles) is also taken under control
7. Conclusions
Summarizing the results of our work, we find  that the total effect of social background on 
the choice of the academic track is weaker in the Netherlands and stronger in Germany, with 
Italy somewhere in between. Moreover, by exploiting the institutional variability across the 
German states with respect to access restrictions into the different tracks, we provide an 
assessment of the impact of admission rules on the parental background effect. Access 
restrictions seem to reduce the effect of social origin on school choices. 
The overall effect appears to be stronger in Germany than in Italy (where access is free) 
and the Netherlands (where access is also regulated) even in those Länder where these 
restrictions apply, suggesting that these rules alone do not necessarily counterbalance the 
negative effects on equality of opportunity due to other features of the school design.         
We may try to gather the empirical evidence from PIRLS and PISA in order to make some 
conjectures on the size of primary and secondary  effects of social background. The line of 
reasoning is summarized in Table 8.
Table 8 should be interpreted as follows. The terms “low”, “medium” and “high” are not to 
be interpreted as absolute assessments, they are just rough comparative evaluations within the 
set of countries under study. Column (1) and (5) refer to the “strong” empirical evidence 
described in the previous sections. In column (1) we evaluate primary effects as resulting 
from the analyses of PIRLS data, while column (5) refers to the ASE of ESCS, estimated in 
Section 6.2. The content of the other columns is instead largely speculative: the question 
marks next to the attributes are meant to stress this point. 
Start from column (3). What can we say about the relation between ability and school 
type? We assume that, given the existence of formal assessments of ability, l should be large 
in the German-rigid case and for the Netherlands (as suggested also by the descriptive 
evidence reported in Section 3). Since we have little direct information for Italy and German-
19not rigid states, although these effects are likely to be lower here, we leave the corresponding 
cells empty.  
Now move to column (4). Given g and l we can also assess the indirect effect. The indirect 
effect should be medium or high for the Netherlands and high for German-rigid states. The 
last step is column (2). The direct effect is assessed as the “difference” between the total 
effect and the indirect effect. According to this speculative reasoning, we should conclude 
that secondary effects are likely to be very low in the Dutch system and higher in the 
German-rigid states. Both states have an early-tracking system and restrictions on secondary 
school choice.
Table 8.  A speculative assessment of the different components of the social background effect














ITALY medium ? ? ? medium
NETHERLAND medium very low? high? medium?
high?
low
GERMANY-RIGID high medium? high? high? medium-high
GERMANY-NOT 
RIGID               high ? ? ? high
If we wish to move from conjectures to more reliable conclusions longitudinal data is 
called for. Following Breen  et al  (2005, pg. 7)  “.. primary and secondary effects are 
impossible to disentangle without adequate longitudinal data. Studies like those of PISA 
would urgently need a longitudinal design to improve our understanding of cross-national 
differences in primary and secondary effects of social class.”. 
20Appendix - The simulation study
The aim of the simulation study is threefold:
• to  investigate the downward bias in parameter estimation in the logistic regression model 
for track choice when ability at the moment of choice is altogether omitted;
• to assess ASE, rather than ESA, as the main tool to interpret the effects of explanatory 
variables in the above context;
• to evaluate the consequences of including PISA performance scores as a proxy of students' 
unobserved ability at the moment of school choice.
Given the complexity of the context and aiming at mimicking as closely as possible the 
structure of the actual choice mechanisms, the simulation environment was built with direct 
reference to real data
25 whenever feasible. Simulated data included track choice outcome ST, 
ability at the moment of choice y1, PISA scores y2, and ESCS levels SB as defined in section 
3.
A.1 - The simulation model
For each simulated context, 35 independent samples of size n = 1000 are created. 
The track choice outcome ST is derived from a linear utility model where expected utility Uji 
of choosing track j for unit i depends on SB and on y1:
U 0i=00 SBi0 y1i0i ;
U 1i=11SBi1 y1i1i ;
ST i={
1 if U 1iU 0i
0 if U 1i≤U 0i
Error terms e0i and e1i are independent and both extreme-value distributed.
Parameters of (2a) are thus derived as  =1−0 ; =1−0 ; =1−0 . For any set 
(l;x), m is adjusted to get a Pr(STi = 1) reasonably close to the marginal observed probability.
ESCS is obtained from a normal distribution with the observed mean and variance (it is an 
internationally standardized index, but its values can differ somewhat at the national level). 
This is a slight simplification, since the real distribution is a bit differently skewed for Italy 
and Germany. Moreover, ESCS is  strictly  never larger than 2.4; the simulated normal 
distributions were thus similarly truncated.
Ability y1 is unobserved on a per-unit basis, but its distribution can be approximated using 
scores obtained in PIRLS tests at age 9 (pre-track for both countries). The observed 
distribution of such scores is apparently normal, and the scores are measured on a scale 
similar to that used in PISA. 
y1 depends also on parental socio-economic status: to take this into account an estimate of 
g as in (1) is obtained from a linear regression on highest parental educational status estimated 
for PIRLS test scores. This value is then employed for generating y1, assuming that it 
represents the true coefficient of the continuous measure of social background ESCS level, 
which more fully describes socio-economic status in PISA and is closely related to parental 
educational status (see note 8).
Finally, a generic PISA score y2 is obtained based on its observed distribution  (also close 
25 With reference to PISA and PIRLS data for the Italian and German cases.
21to normal) first two moments, while being linearly related to SB, y1 and ST, as in (3). Values 
of a',  g' and d' are based on the estimation of model (3) on actual data omitting unobserved 
y1, but g' and d' are reasonably deflated to compensate for the omission. b' is instead assumed 
= 0,5, so that a Dy1 increase in previous ability implies half the increase on PISA score. 
 On each of the 35 simulated samples, logistic regression models for ST are then estimated 
with the following explanatory variables:
• both  y1  and  SB  (full model), to check how simulated samples mirror the simulation 
scheme;
• SB only (reduced model), to study how this affects estimation of the total effect x+lg of 
socio-economic family status on track choice;
• SB and   y2, to assess how (and how much) the inclusion of PISA scores can cause an 
incorrect evaluation of the above total effect.
Besides parameter estimates, ASE and ESA associated to x+lg are computed for every 
model both in the full and the reduced case, to check their invariance in the present situation 
(more complex that that addressed by Cramer, 2005) and better understand their behaviour 
and its relation to parameter estimates.
This framework is applied to different combinations of  x  and  l, both impossible to 
estimate directly, considering also some differing values of  g, since its value reflects the 
correlation between the observed and the omitted variable in the reduced model.
A2. Parameters estimation bias and ASE
The tendency to show downward bias in parameter estimates in Logit models with omitted 
variables (even if uncorrelated with included regressors, as shown in Cramer, 2005) is indeed 
striking, making the former often unsuitable to evaluate the effect of  observed variables on 
the examined probability. 
Table 4 shows this through the results for the reduced model applied to different sets of 
simulated data, all producing estimates of x+lg that are similar and very close to estimated value 
for Italy (approximately 1.12), while having a true underlying x+lg that can strongly differ. 
In the table E(  ) and     are respectively the mean and standard error of 
the estimates of x+lg on the 35 simulated samples based on the same set of parameters.
In all cases in the higher half of the table E(  ) is similar to 1.128, but the set values 
of x+lg required to obtain such estimate are close to 1.128 only if l is near zero, i.e. in 
unlikely contexts where student's ability at the moment of track choice is irrelevant.
The downward bias is persistent also when the omitted variable y1 is uncorrelated with the 
observed one ST (g=0), as in the lower part of Table 4. In this context primary effects are not 
at play; here x+lg has been fixed to 1.128 but E(  ) moves further away from it as 
secondary effects strengthen (l increases).
Both alternative measures ASE and ESA were then studied on the same sets of simulations. 
However, whereas ESA exhibits unpredictable variation when passing from the full to the 
reduced model,  ASE  displays almost complete invariance for all parameter combinations. 
Remarkably, this result holds also when the omitted variable y1 is far from uncorrelated to SB, 
as in the higher half of Table 4, which shows ASE values associated with the total effect x+lg 
for the estimated full models and - as in Cramer (2005) - the ratio of ASE values in the 
reduced w.r. to the full models (equivalent ratios for  ESA  are also reported, showing 
significant instability). As before, mean values over the 35 simulated samples are presented, 
together with their standard errors.
22Such results strongly suggest that the use of ASE, as opposed to regression coefficients, 
can give clearer and more reliable indications on the data structure examined with logistic 
regressions.
Table 9. Estimated, true total effect parameters, ASE, ASE and ESA ratios for reduced models















0.064 1.400 25 3.000 1.188 0.084 0.198 0.011 1.017 0.068 1.195
0.044 1.000 25 2.000 1.092 0.072 0.197 0.018 0.989 0.068 0.909
0.034 0.950 25 1.650 1.102 0.071 0.175 0.008 0.998 0.048 0.945
0.024 0.900 25 1.500 1.084 0.091 0.197 0.010 0.988 0.036 0.833
0.014 0.900 25 1.400 1.123 0.093 0.198 0.010 1.002 0.028 0.960
0.004 1.050 25 1.200 1.130 0.077 0.202 0.013 1.002 0.008 1.008
0.014 1.128 0 1.128 0.962 0.088 0.176 0.013 0.999 0.025 0.950
0.024 1.128 0 1.128 0.783 0.087 0.156 0.009 0.977 0.049 0.805
0.034 1.128 0 1.128 0.666 0.071 0.124 0.010 0.997 0.069 0.908
0.044 1.128 0 1.128 0.538 0.068 0.106 0.011 1.008 0.085 0.872
0.064 1.128 0 1.128 0.436 0.074 0.086 0.008 1.018 0.131 1.162
0.084 1.128 0 1.128 0.312 0.065 0.064 0.010 1.046 0.179 1.162
A3. Endogeneity of Pisa scores and its effects
Evaluation of the consequences of including PISA score y2 in the model for ST is complex 
since they depend markedly on other parameters values. No attempt to reach systematic 
conclusions is made here, focusing instead on just presenting some examples where this can 
lead to inappropriate results in different directions.
In this way it is easy to simulate cases where parameters estimates for SB and y2 (used as 





are both downward biased, both upward biased or else biased in opposite directions.
In some cases the estimate of x can even be negative, as in third column. It is interesting to 
notice that even in cases where d' is smaller, the track choice ST not having a large influence 
on y2 (for example where the timespan between PISA survey and track choice is small), 
results can be definitely misleading.
23Table 10. Different bias configurations when using PISA scores y2 in logistic regression models for ST
 ,   both 
biased downward
 ,   both 
biased upward
   biased downward
   biased upward
   biased downward
   biased upward
x 0,399 0,764 0,764 0,028
l 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,044
g 37 25 25 25
b' 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
g' 23 0 50 20
d'  82 200 200 45
E(   ) 0,355 0,843 -0,846 0,260
  0,108 0,173 0,222 0,074
E(   ) 0,020 0,034 0,034 0,013
  0,001 0,003 0,003 0,001
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